

Background Report on Changes in the Organization and Ideology  
of Philanthropic Foundations with a Focus on Environmental Issues  
as Reflected in Contemporary Social Science Research

Prepared for  
The Public Inquiry into Funding of Anti-Alberta Energy Campaigns  
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## Environmental Philanthropy

### 1. Introduction

Following these brief introductory comments, section two of this report consists of a summary and analysis of recent writings in social science concerning changes in the world of philanthropic foundations. I have paid particular attention to environmentally focussed philanthropies and to changes in their recent funding strategies.

Section three of the report discusses the ideological justification of contemporary environmental activism. In this context I am using the term ideological in a more precise way than it is used in ordinary conversation. The purpose of ideology in the sense used here is to persuade human beings to act, usually by combining language that looks vaguely scientific or philosophical with an appeal to a sense of injustice and indignation or to a desire to criticize others because the world is not, to the critic's way of looking at things, as it ought to be. All ideologists, whatever the content of their views, consider all opinions except their own as instruments of domination. In contrast, their own views, and the acceptance of them by others, are instruments of liberation and the actualization of justice.<sup>1</sup>

For the most part, ideological thinkers are not concerned with differences of opinion or perspective and even less in coming to a compromise over conflicting interests. So far as ideologies are concerned, all that counts is their truth and the untruth of others. This is what makes discussion with ideologues difficult and honest disagreement all but impossible. Because they use a language that looks scientific it often needs to be decoded. I have done so on a few occasions in this report. Most importantly, however, because ideologues are more concerned with persuading people to act politically rather than to understand political acts, their language and the reality to which, at least notionally it refers, constitute the subject-matter for analysis. That is, ideological discussion is part of the political reality that needs to be understood. It

cannot, therefore, be understood on its own terms because (to repeat) it aims not at understanding reality, which is the purpose of science, including political science, but at motivating individuals to act with the ostensible purpose of changing reality.

Unfortunately for all ideologues, whether located on what we conventionally term the left or the right of a socio-economic-political spectrum, human beings are capable only of acting within reality or, as we sometimes say, within the world. They cannot change reality or change the world. Because ideologues tend to ignore this aspect of reality, areas of friction are created between their ideological aspirations (sometimes called in political science a “second reality”) and the common reality of the world within which all human beings act.

So far as the discussion of ideology is concerned, in section three of this report, much of the material analyzed is a reflection of the intellectual and spiritual disorders that have been part of university life for the past half century. For individuals outside the university, many of the arguments made will appear to violate the most basic and commonsensical assumptions that enable normal individuals to navigate and negotiate their daily lives. Hence the occasional decoding of the ideological language employed by some environmentalists. The author is a member of a department of political science, not a department of political ideology, which means that, within the universe of academic social science, there exists a conceptual vocabulary that can be used to make sense of the ideological environmentalist that, at first encounter, looks very odd indeed. I will conclude this report with a few observations and recommendations. Since this report is intended for a non-academic audience, I have placed references in endnotes rather than at the bottom of the page to facilitate the reading of it.

## 2. The Organization of Philanthropy

There is no agreed upon definition in law or in the social science literature of what a philanthropic foundation is. This is because such organizations, however defined, are often indistinguishable in their activities from organizations such as research institutes, think-tanks, museums and so on. Moreover, foundations often change their activities from, say, issuing research grants to outsiders, to providing funds for their own employees to conduct research and then to publish it. In that respect they are indistinguishable from think-tanks.<sup>2</sup> One study concluded that a “consensus” definition would be something like this:

A philanthropic foundation is a nongovernmental, not-for-profit organization with funds of its own provided by a donor or donors, managed by its own trustees or directors, and with a program designed to maintain or aid socially useful activities and purposes. A corollary to this definition, however, is that a foundation must have been primarily set up not to get or make money but to make grants from such funds.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast, “charities” or “acts of charity” are generally the result of individual rather than organizational efforts aimed at ameliorating what a donor or charitable giver considers to be a woeful situation.

Both private charities and philanthropic organizations have one major characteristic in common: they can influence the world of public policy but, compared to governments in liberal democracies, are relatively independent and are less publicly accountable.<sup>4</sup> This does not mean that they are unregulated, but that the regulations governing philanthropic organizations in North America give them considerable discretion, flexibility, and freedom of action. Moreover, since donations to philanthropic organizations are usually considered as charitable donations for tax purposes, tax-exempt giving is both a manifestation of a perennial human attribute of generosity and a way to avoid giving money to the government, which is to say, to bureaucrats, in the form of taxes. Supporting a philanthropic organization, for many donors, is also a way of ensuring that

they, not the government, control where their money is spent. Such a model of expenditures on public policy has appealed to individuals on all sides of the political spectrum, from the utopian or revolutionary left to the utopian or revolutionary right.

In recent years there have been four major structural changes in the world of North American philanthropy. Since most of the social science research has been done on American organizations, trends in the United States provide most of the information discussed in the following paragraphs.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, since American foundations have been active in Canada since the time when the Carnegie Corporation was building libraries or the Rockefeller Foundation was sponsoring academic studies of Social Credit, the differences between American and Canadian law (with a major exception noted below) seem, in this context to be for the most part of secondary significance.

The first change is in the sheer proliferation of philanthropic organizations. In 2014 there were about 76,000 grant making foundations in the U.S. In 1995 they controlled assets of about \$272 billion; in 2012, \$625 billion.<sup>6</sup> The graph<sup>7</sup> reproduced below gives a visual presentation of a rather dramatic change. Or, as Faber and McCarthy observed, in the twenty years before 2005, foundation assets increased 1000%.<sup>8</sup>




Figure 1. Total dollars given to EMOs in constant 2000 dollars, 1961 to 2000.

A second change concerned what might be called the internal organization of philanthropic foundations, particularly those with a focus on the environment and associated topics. Early in the twentieth century philanthropic efforts were devoted chiefly to what today would be called conservation rather than environmentalism as it is presently understood. Early in the twentieth century the focus shifted from “game protection” to “wildlife management.” And even then there were divisions between conservationists, who continue to exist in such organizations as Ducks Unlimited, and preservationists who emphasized “the value of preserving untouched nature versus conserving resources for human use.”<sup>9</sup>

For most of the twentieth century major and traditional philanthropic organizations gave the bulk of their support to traditional conservationist groups.<sup>10</sup> But as Brulle and Jenkins also noted, this kind of “institutional philanthropy” also happens to be based “on the interests of the wealthy, and thus is a relic of class domination.”<sup>11</sup> It should be pointed out that a great deal of unsubstantiated argument, amounting to a *petitio principii*, is contained in that “thus.” The context that makes such usage persuasive is entirely Marxist, and Marxism is, of course, a widely held ideological view among social scientists who engage with the question of environmental philanthropy.<sup>12</sup> Delfin and Tang summarized a number of studies along these lines: “A common critique of American philanthropy is that foundations serve as instruments of the elite for sociopolitical hegemony” in order to ensure that social change is “gradual, moderate, and unambiguously controlled by society’s dominant classes.”<sup>13</sup> Typically, such organizations attempt to “channel” social movements into moderate and responsible courses by “professionalizing” them. In the “social movement literature” in social science<sup>14</sup>, the point of such channeling is invariably “social control.”<sup>15</sup> In a Marxist framework, where the only relevant variable is class conflict, how could it be any other way? For Marxists, philanthropies are

necessarily instruments of class domination. Their purpose can only be to keep the environmental movement in line.

A variant interpretation of the purpose of environmental philanthropy as a means to moderate and control the activities of members of the environmental movement has been called “field-building.” On the one hand, “building a field” is not “about *imposing* networks and frames on a set of actors as much as it is about *enrolling* actors into a collective project.” Building a field means bringing a wide array of different actors into routine contact with one another and having them share a common frame of reference to pursue at least partially shared projects. “Building an organizational field entails fostering inter-organizational networks, promoting particular conceptions of appropriate action (or field frames), and enrolling others into a collective project.” For environmental activists, “field-building” represents an opportunity to recruit philanthropic funding organizations to the cause. On occasion when the boards of philanthropic organizations or the professional staff are not entirely sympathetic to the purposes and programs of environmental activists, it is necessary to work around the problem. Sometimes, when there are sympathetic program officers this can be done simply by rebranding a program from, for example, environmental justice to a children’s health initiative. As one activist foundation program officer put it, this “reframing of the movement’s goals/projects” is referred to as “foundation speak.” That is, activist proposals are “adjusted” into “foundation speak” in order to appear sufficiently innocuous to gain board approval.<sup>16</sup> For the boards of such philanthropies even when they are outmaneuvered by clever activists, the goal of grant-giving remains, according to analysts such as Bartley, social control.<sup>17</sup>

The persuasiveness of the Marxist view, that environmental philanthropy favours rich donors who enjoy, for example, shooting ducks and fly fishing in pristine mountain streams<sup>18</sup>,

along with the massive increase in available environmental philanthropical money has been “creating opportunities for new EMOs [Environmental Movement Organizations] and reducing the concentration of EMO grant giving” to the conventional, conservationist, reform, and preservationist organizations.<sup>19</sup> One of the results has been “that funding for alternative discourses, especially environmental justice, did see significant growth in the 1990s.” The use of the term “alternative discourses” is borrowed from the French thinker, Michel Foucault. In this context it does not actually mean a speech so much as a speech that justifies an action. That is, it refers to the *practical* effects of speech.<sup>20</sup>

According to environmental activists, however, these “alternative discourse” options have hardly been exploited at all. According to Mark Dowie, for example:

Most members of national organizations are passive check writers and occasional letter writers, essential perhaps to the organization, and of some value to this cause of environmental protection, but hardly vital to the grass-roots commitment and energy essential to any successful social movement. Changing the balance, so the grass-roots groups can be stronger, is an essential challenge for the world of philanthropy.<sup>21</sup>

For activists such as he, “those big green groups” neither respect nor show concern for genuine grass-roots individuals and focus their efforts on extracting money from their “inert” membership. For activists in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the problem remained the unwillingness of environmentalist philanthropies to fund sufficiently the “alternative discourse” organizations that were willing to take risks that never would occur to supporters of Ducks Unlimited. This division led to the appropriation by activist groups of an earlier distinction among interest groups between genuine grass-roots operations and “astroturf” ones. The former are made up of participatory members, the latter of donors who let the professional staff run the organization.<sup>22</sup>



To recapitulate: the first change in the philanthropic landscape was the massive increase in philanthropic spending. The second was a change in the internal composition of the environmental movement, *sensu lato*, with the growing distinction between activists (and in their minds, they constitute the environmental movement, *sensu stricto*) and their elite funders. The third major change is that, in recent years, nearly all the grant-giving organizations cheerfully acknowledge that the old days of relatively independent and relatively neutral philanthropic organizations, which existed since the early decades of the twentieth century, are gone. The days of promoting, at least in their own eyes, the general public interest, which was how much early and now very large organizations such as Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller understood their activities, have come to a close. As Jane Mayer noted, “because the self-perception of these institutions was that they were engaged in a modern, even scientific pursuit of truth, they did not regard themselves as liberal, although frequently the answers they brought to social problems involved government solutions.”<sup>23</sup>

The change towards what was later called “strategic philanthropy,”<sup>24</sup> or “philanthropic activism” where “grantmakers go beyond the traditional role of dispensing funds to undertake additional individual and collective actions that further the core mission of the foundation,”<sup>25</sup> can be dated to the presidency of McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation and his sponsorship of what he termed “advocacy philanthropy.” Bundy had been the dean of arts and science at Harvard, then a hawkish National Security Advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations prior to becoming the leader of the Ford Foundation in 1966. He shifted the focus of Ford from supporting research and expertise to supporting groups such as the Environmental Defence Fund, the Women’s Law Fund, the Natural Resources Defence Fund and others who “claimed to speak for and to be the legitimate representatives of their respective causes.” Such causes promoted

specific legislative initiatives that were followed by efforts “to influence the regulatory bodies and federal courts that implemented and interpreted the laws.” They began “what is now a familiar phenomenon on the American political scene: the well-placed advocacy group nursing a grievance against American society and seeking compensation on behalf of its members.”<sup>26</sup> The Bundy-Ford initiative was soon matched by changes on the right. In law schools, for example, the Olin Foundation introduced “law and economics” programs to counter the “progressive” and “critical legal studies” programs supported by Ford.<sup>27</sup>

Starting in the late 1970s, philanthropy came under the influence of non-traditional “institutional entrepreneurs” who created new philanthropic organizations designed specifically to support policies that heavily-resourced individuals thought were important.<sup>28</sup> One measure of the change is that there have been no major investigations of philanthropic activities in the United States for over a generation.<sup>29</sup> Kiger’s explanation was that:

The emergence of new and powerful economic combines in the United States and the acquisition of vast new wealth by the likes of Messrs. Annenberg, Buffet, Gates, Packard, Soros, Templeton, Turner, and Walton and the foundations they have projected or have created and are operating have been accepted with little or no outcry from the Left or the Right.<sup>30</sup>

The result of new money, new institutional entrepreneurs, and new priorities, particularly in the United States, is to have created a free-for-all context within which foundations now operate. Both progressive-liberal and capitalist-conservative foundations have criticized their opponents for not playing fair, but both sides have learned from their adversaries and both have argued that, by supporting financially one or another cause or point of view, they have enhanced their own importance. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ideological arguments advanced by the progressive liberal left regarding environmental issues. As we shall see in the following section,

progressive environmentalists have nearly silenced their opponents. Such a rhetorical triumph, however, has its own consequences. Hubris is invariably followed by nemesis.

The final major change has taken a slightly different form in Canada than it has in the United States. As Jane Mayer pointed out in her generally critical account of right-wing and conservative philanthropy, in the 1980s Richard Fink drew up a three-phase strategy for the Koch brothers to enable them to counter the Bundy initiative at the Ford Foundation. First, the Kochs would invest in conservative intellectuals and in publishing their research; second, they would invest in think-tanks to market the research to a wider audience; third, they would subsidize citizen-groups to pressure politicians and other elected officials.<sup>31</sup> The last-named activity meant making contributions to political action committees (PACs) from philanthropic organizations. Under American law such political contributions could be anonymous. In contrast, in Canada, all political contributions above \$200 must be publicly reported. Moreover, there are strict limits on what is called “third-party spending,” which is to say, money spent by groups other than political parties during an election. As a consequence, PACs in the American sense are illegal in Canada.

In 2010 the American Supreme Court decided the *Citizens United* case which ended the \$5000 cap on individual contributions to PACs. This expansive reading of Americans’ First Amendment rights to free speech created a new kind of political organization, dubbed a Super-PAC. This new vehicle enabled wealthy Americans to make even larger contributions in support of what in Canada would be (illegal) third-party expenditures.

The point of mentioning this ruling with regard to political campaign financing in the United States is to indicate that Americans have a much more wide-open regulatory regime regarding political spending in general than does Canada. This same approach is carried over to

another innovation pioneered in the U.S., the “regranting” foundation, the novelty and importance of which constitutes the final major change in philanthropic organizations. Under American law, a charity can re-donate funds it has received and give the money to another organization without charitable status so long as the charity exercises control over how the second non-charity spends the funds. For example, donor A wishes to support a non-charitable organization, C. To do so, and receive tax receipt, donor A advances money to charity B which passes the money on to organization C. Donor A gets a tax receipt from charity B along with the assurance that his or her funds actually will be directed to support the work of organization C, and overseen by charity B. Moreover, donor A can request that his or her effective gift to organization C can remain anonymous.

The most significant of these new vehicles, which Mayer said were engaged in “stealth funding,” is likely the Tides Foundation and Tides Center of San Francisco.<sup>32</sup> Tides is balanced on the right by Donors Trust of New York.<sup>33</sup> Tides has certainly been an important source of funds for the environmental movement in Canada, usually operating through the Tides Canada Foundation and the Tides Canada Initiatives Society, headquartered in Vancouver.

Tides’ supporters called the San Francisco operation an “alternative community foundation” because “it grew out of the frustration with established philanthropy’s overwhelming neglect of progressive issues.”<sup>34</sup> The Tides Center, in particular, has mentored several non-profit environmental activist organizations. As indicated in the general “stealth funding” model, the Tides Center “has to accept expenditure responsibility for these pass-through monies, but that is easily accomplished through the administrative and financial management systems that it has in place.”<sup>35</sup> Tides opponents have characterized the operation “an especially significant organism in the ecosystem of anti-capitalism.”<sup>36</sup> A US Senate minority

report, which was generally critical of Tides and their major funders, observed: “both Tides Foundation and Tides Center heavily support each other. Between 2010 and 2012, Tides Foundation gave over \$10 million to Tides Center, and Tides Center gave over \$39 million to Tides Foundation. It is unclear what purpose the transfer of funds between these two organizations serves, other than obscuring the money trail.”<sup>37</sup>

These four major changes in the structure of philanthropic organizations, chiefly in the United States, have enabled foundations engaged in supporting the environmental movement to become more activist themselves. Because foundations have largely supported social movements rather than political parties or conducted government lobbying campaigns (though these activities are not unknown) sociologists who have studied this activity usually refer to green social movements or to environmental movement organizations, EMOs.<sup>38</sup> In addition, as we will argue in the next section, these organizational changes have enabled ideologically-motivated activists to conduct their affairs untethered from either political or economic responsibility or from commonsense. In terms of undertaking a dialogue with ideological activists, this is of course regrettable. Alternatively, one may consider the following section to constitute a realistic appraisal or obstacles to undertaking a moderate and practical negotiating policy.

### 3. Ideology and Environmentalism

According to Delfin and Tang, “California foundations have traditionally been stronger supporters of the environment than have their counterparts in other states.”<sup>39</sup> They accordingly found that in California “private foundations do not consistently favor mainstream national groups” and seem to be more willing to fund local and direct action organizations as well, including those concerned with “second-wave problems” such as “global warming.”<sup>40</sup> Indeed, from about 2000 on, the problem of “global warming,” and anthropogenic global warming in

particular, was not so much a question of scientific investigation as a premise for environmental activism. In the research undertaken for this report I came across *no* study of environmental philanthropy that ever raised the question of the status of the hypothesis of anthropogenic climate change. It was simply taken as given.<sup>41</sup> Nor was there any discussion of the relative importance of anthropogenic climate change compared to natural changes (a difficult problem to sort out for philosophy of science reasons), or any discussion of measurement ambiguities, or similar genuine problems.

A second consideration is that by the mid-2000s, at least in California, environmental philanthropy was *not* directed chiefly toward traditional flagship environmental groups. In a subsequent study Delfin and Tang found “that large private California foundations have not been shy in supporting mainstream NGOs that are involved in direct action and other forms of grassroots mobilization and services.”<sup>42</sup> Such foundations were *not* in the business of strictly supervising grantees, partly because of administrative costs, but partly as well because the foundations were in ideological alignment with the direct action of the grantees. As the authors noted, “Instead of causing fundamental social change, what foundations can do is to help accelerate change, to selectively help reduce some negative side effects of the change, or to infuse positive change with professional legitimacy.”<sup>43</sup>

A central document from the mid-2000s was entitled *Design to Win: Philanthropy's Role in the Fight Against Global Warming*.<sup>44</sup> The mood was imperative: “we must put a price on carbon to force businesses, consumers and governments to pay for their pollution.”<sup>45</sup> Carbon, or rather carbon dioxide, was understood to be a pollutant and the immediate goal was practical, namely to minimize coal-fired power stations, promote “emissions-free power generation,” namely wind and solar, and avoid “considering the polarizing option of nuclear energy.” In

addition *Design to Win* would promote carbon capture and sequestration and would do all these things by pooling and targeting philanthropic funds. The amounts were impressive: funding was to increase from \$200 million a year in 2007 to \$600 million by 2017. The basic argument was that regulators would create market conditions (or market distortions) to “send the right signals for a transition to a low-carbon economy.”

*Design to Win* provided a blueprint that the sponsoring foundations followed in the creation of Climate Works, another regranting organization like Tides, and tasked with spending a billion dollars worldwide to suppress climate change. This time the two major California foundations, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation were joined by the “national” foundations including the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation. Once again nuclear energy was off the table and so was substituting natural gas for coal—despite the fracking boom and the abundance of inexpensive natural gas.<sup>46</sup> The premise for *Design to Win* and Climate Works to succeed was that, following the election of Barack Obama in 2008 a national cap-and-trade scheme would be implemented.

In the event the cap-and-trade bill was defeated in the Republican-controlled Senate. Theda Skocpol, a sociologist at Harvard and one of the celebrity social scientists of the day, provided a detailed report on what went wrong.<sup>47</sup> To begin with, she said, expectations of easy passage of the legislation were too high. To supporters, cap-and-trade made perfect sense and on those grounds alone it was as close to a sure thing as one might find. Skocpol even compared the proposal to the earlier campaign against acid rain, which in her view was a brilliant success.<sup>48</sup> There was plenty of foundation support, via Climate Works, to encourage “professional environmental groups” to support Democrats and fight “global warming.”<sup>49</sup> The messaging and

PR, however, was poor because they involved inter-organizational deals among corporations, unions, industries and so on, and did not focus on specific benefits to be delivered to individual citizens. Skocpol did not say what such “specific benefits” might be. As a result, the simpler “cap-and-tax” argument of the anti-cap-and-trade groups was more persuasive. She concluded that better communications and a better strategy in the future was needed to bring victory. Specifically, Skocpol wanted to bring the “Green Network,” who were allies of the Democrats and in favour of carbon taxes, into an alliance with the “Innovation Network,” which favoured technological solutions such as wind, solar, and other renewables.

However sensible Skocpol’s proposals may have seemed to major foundations and her colleagues at Harvard, a significant number of activists and their supporters, particularly on the West coast, rejected the premise of *Design to Win*, namely that compromise agreements with industry were either desirable or even possible. They changed the focus from industry to the public and decided to invest in mobilizing public demand for legislative action. With a relatively less informed target than industry, the alarmist rhetoric they had come to favour could be enhanced with less chance of informed criticism.<sup>50</sup> As Amy Luers put it, “most climate advocacy starts with carbon, asking: How many tons of carbon (emitted) do we need to reduce.” Such was the failed *Design to Win* strategy. A better approach was to look to “people” and ask: “How strong a political and public base of support do we need to enact significant climate policies?”<sup>51</sup> Because, to use the current cliché, “the science is settled,” all that mattered was power and packaging a program in an attractive enough way to get it.

There were plenty of ideological options to consider in the wake of the apparent failure of moderate or “mainstream” approaches. All aimed to engage with “first principles” and get to the root of environmental problems. A concern with the root (*radix*), as Marx used to say, is what



made such people “radical.” “Claiming authenticity, against the failed ‘mainstream’ discourses, critical intellectuals and activists articulated ecofeminist, ecospiritual, animal rights, deep ecology, and green/antiglobalization discourses, and focussed on the need for environmental justice.”<sup>52</sup> Some of the “alternative discourses” listed by Carmichael, Jenkins and Brulle such as ecospiritualism and even ecofeminism are of marginal interest and importance except perhaps to their devotés.<sup>53</sup> A more central and more effective environmental movement is organized under the name of “environmental justice,” sometimes abbreviated as “EJ.”<sup>54</sup>

The environmental justice movement is based on the claim that environmental degradation disproportionately has an impact on poor and minority communities. It was founded in 1991 at the People of Color Environmental Justice Summit in Washington DC in order to (once again) challenge mainstream environmentalists.<sup>55</sup> What has given the environmental justice movement its force and significance, as Buttel pointed out, “is the fact that it links the themes of environmentalism and social and racial justice in a way that can bring forward an impressive level of mobilization about local and regional environmental issues.”<sup>56</sup>

One of the most effective, and likely the most famous of the EJ advocates is Bill McKibben and his 350.org operation. He is best known at least in Canada for leading the opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline expansion. He has also led protests in favour of energy industry divestment and the blocking of additional pipeline construction across North America. “In doing so, they [McKibben and 350.org] pioneered new internet-based ‘strategies’ that combined face-to-face organizing with various online tools, turning out tens of thousands of protesters at rallies, and mobilizing college students, faculty, and church parishioners to lobby their institutions on behalf of divestment.”<sup>57</sup>

McKibben's strategy is known in the social movement and environmental movement literature as mounting a "radical flank." The term originated in analysis of the American civil rights movement to describe a relatively extreme or radical position that made heretofore radical positions seem moderate. As Herbert Haines observed, "a *positive flank effect* can occur when the bargaining position of moderates is strengthened by the presence of more radical groups."<sup>58</sup> Thus did the rhetoric of Malcom X make the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. look moderate. In the context of environmental justice, McKibben's article on divestiture in *Rolling Stone* in 2012 was intended to make more moderate proposals such as a carbon tax more appealing.<sup>59</sup> In other words, radicals such as McKibben "strengthened the negotiating position of moderates, who in turn provide a pathway for central issues to move toward radical goals."<sup>60</sup>

Radical flanking does not, however, amount to a one-way ratchet. Its immediate effect may be the opposite of what the radical flanker intended, namely "to motivate an opposing radical flank. This dynamic is apparent in the election of a new administration [i.e., the Trump administration] that openly dismisses the idea of climate change and plans to dismantle his predecessor's climate policy initiatives."<sup>61</sup> An overly ambitious movement fringe that forgets its tactical position in the larger strategic operation "carries the risk of provoking a negative radical flank effect, where the broader movement loses credibility. For example, many who dismiss the reality of climate change used [Naomi] Klein's arguments as proof for what they had been arguing all along: that the climate change movement is, at its heart, anti-development, anti-capitalist, socialist or even communist."<sup>62</sup>

The first major event in Canada that had as its theme Environmental Justice took place at the annual social science meetings in 2005. The papers presented there were subsequently published in part in *Local Environment* and in part in *Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental*

*Justice in Canada*.<sup>63</sup> According to Randolph Haluza-Delay, “In Canada, there is no discernable ‘environmental justice’ movement, and environmental justice research is limited.” At the same time, however, he was able to evoke several themes held in common with the American EJ movement. “If environmental racism has been the most prevalent trope in the American environmental justice frame, Canadian environmental inequality research is dominated by situations involving aboriginal peoples.”<sup>64</sup> First Nations people were central to discussions of tainted water on Ontario reserves and fish farming off the BC coast.<sup>65</sup> Cheryl Teelucksingh was even able to discover “environmental racialization” and “the hidden and latent nature of racial oppression in Canada” in the Metropolitan Toronto suburb of Scarborough.<sup>66</sup> If a vigilant sociologist can find hidden racial oppression in Scarborough, they can find it anywhere.

As Mitchell and D’Onofrio said regarding environmental injustice and racism in Canada, “the first step is admitting we have a problem.”<sup>67</sup> In their paper the authors apply the concepts of environmental injustice and environmental racism, which, to recall, were developed at the 1991 conference in Washington to deal with genuine environmental problems, particularly in the South and particularly as they affected the African Americans living near actual toxic waste dumps. With some reluctance the authors found that things were not so bad in Canada regarding First Nations as they were in the South regarding African Americans. The lesson they drew, rather like Teelucksingh examining racialization in Scarborough, was that Canadians will have to look even harder to discover similarities with the US—which the authors then proceed to do. They never raised questions regarding differing historical contexts: why they expected an indigenous population and their descendants to be comparable to the situation of the descendants of chattel slaves was simply not addressed. The obvious comparison would seem to be between Canadian First Nations and Native Americans. Instead, they preferred to remain faithful to the

abstract categories of racialized Marxism. Their main conclusions were accordingly obvious: First, “the brunt of environmental harm in Canada is borne by Aboriginal and low income communities;” second, “Canada *also* has a pattern of environmental inequities relating to race and socio-economic status involving disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards as well as uneven participation in environmental decision-making.”<sup>68</sup> Really, we are as bad as the Americans.

An apogee of sorts that combined a made-in-Canada Marxist fundamentalism with racialized Environmental Justice is Dayna Nadine Scott’s article, “The Networked Infrastructure of Fossil Capitalism.”<sup>69</sup> In it she applied an EJ “perspective” to Enbridge’s Line 9 and the now cancelled Northern Gateway project. Crude oil, she said, can be conceptualized as “a material flow of commodified nature.” The term, commodified nature, was borrowed from Marx and gave her discussion a suitably abstract yet “scientific” tone. She was particularly concerned with the “ecological hinterland” of Canadian petroleum products. It included:

The people and the formerly wild spaces of the Athabasca Delta downstream of the tar sands, it has for a century included the people of Aamjiwnaang First Nation downwind of Sarnia’s Chemical Valley, and it may soon include the communities of east-end Montréal, Champlain Heights, Saint John, and across the over-burdened US gulf coast; if “tide water” is reached, that hinterland will also include communities in China and India.<sup>70</sup>

Such an ecumenical ecological hinterland is connected to a similar large-scale revolt. It will be led by the successors to Marx’s proletariat who, in the Canadian context, can only be the racially oppressed First Nations. “It should be unsurprising, then,” she wrote, “that opposition to tar sands pipelines is so often expressed as demands for intergenerational justice, principally voiced by indigenous peoples.”<sup>71</sup> Moreover, she had great expectations for the amplitude of the coming rebellion.

Grassroots indigenous resistance to the federal government's "responsible resource development" agenda...is likely to intensify and manifest in direct action by those disenfranchised by the emerging energy vision for Canada. Those actions are likely to expose the vulnerability of the infrastructure of fossil capitalism. Over the coming months and years, we can expect the growing momentum of the indigenous struggle for greater control over the resources and lands of their traditional territories to shape the flows of commodified nature between core and periphery, and across regions of the country.<sup>72</sup>

Before attempting to make sense of Scott's vision or prediction, let us look at one other recent reflection on the problem of oil sands, pipelines, and First Nations. The expectation of an indigenous resistance to "fossil capitalism" is often contradicted by the support First Nations give to resource development, including infrastructure such as pipelines that are designed to bring petroleum to market. When such decisions are made by First Nations, to Marxists such as we have been considering, this can only be a result of what Marx called false consciousness or as a result of coercion. According to Kane Frost, when First Nations people join in support of pipelines or other industrial development this is the result of "the intense pressures from industry to coopt individuals."<sup>73</sup> More specifically, they are bought off: "Industry invests millions upon millions of dollars annually in direct payments to individuals in these communities who are willing to represent themselves as leaders who support industry proposals." Industry then publicizes their support. But it is all "misrepresentation" and "cooptation," typical divide-and-conquer tactics.<sup>74</sup> The possibility that anyone could be persuaded on the merits of the case or come up with the notion on their own that First Nations could benefit from resource and infrastructure development is simply excluded. Analogous arguments have been developed to dismiss climate scientists who question the alleged consensus opinion.<sup>75</sup>

There is another possibility as well. Granted that First Nations people might have been coerced or bribed by industry it is also possible that they could have been coerced or bribed by

environmentalist missionaries from San Francisco or Vancouver. Frost deals quite deftly with such a possibility:

The allegiance between First Nations and non-indigenous environmental activists has involved many lessons and growing pains, particularly around the potential for large, well-organized and funded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) lacking environmental justice foci to take over campaigns and sideline First Nations interests, a phenomenon widely criticized as a continuation of colonial dynamics. This has led to the spread of strategies for constraining participation of such NGOs and the revival of “protocol” practices which commit participants in direct action campaigns to the support of indigenous leadership.<sup>76</sup>

The “protocol practices” Frost mentioned serve a two-fold purpose. First, they ease the conscience of the non-indigenous environmentalists by giving First Nations at least a nominal pride of place: “Non-indigenous environmental activists are recognizing the rightful place of First Nations at the forefront of environmental fights,” which may even take place in First Nations territories, “but their fights are all of our fights.” Second, they transfigure the implicit racialization of non-indigenous NGO helpers into a question of First Nations sovereignty. “It must also be emphasized,” Frost wrote, “that while these sovereignty fights challenge environmental racism, First Nations sovereignty is not a fight ‘for’ race, but rather for a national identity and sovereignty.”<sup>77</sup>

Neither Scott’s confidence in the coming resolution of this struggle, nor Frost’s *ex cathedra* remarks are tainted with evidence of any kind. This raises an obvious question: what are normal and commonsensical persons to make of such remarks?

The most obvious interpretation of these kinds of evocative essays is that they presuppose support for the evolution of organized philanthropy as indicated in section two along with support for the evolution of environmentalism: what began as a concern with conservation and pollution ended as racialized environmental justice.<sup>78</sup> For individuals on the inside of such a complex development, even if they are authorized social scientists and certified with PhDs, the

development and changes of philanthropy and of environmentalism constitute the reality of the world from within which they write their accounts. For non-ideological commonsensical observers, much of this material is simply preposterous. As a practical matter, as noted above, this divide makes negotiation and mutual understanding difficult.

At the same time, even sympathetic social scientists have noted that the development of radical environmentalist rhetoric has grown increasingly unpersuasive. The focus of the concern of these non-activist (but, as noted, sympathetic) observers has been the implausibility of the apocalyptic terminology used to describe and, at least ostensibly, to justify the discussion of anthropogenic climate change. To state the obvious: from the start of this report the status of anthropogenic climate change has been the unacknowledged elephant in the swimming pool.

We might approach this final consideration of ideological environmentalism by stipulating that public opinion regarding climate change, its causes, and what, if anything, can be done about it has been stable for the past two decades. That said, as Norhaus and Schallenbeger noted, “the lesson of recent years would appear to be that apocalyptic threats—when their impacts are relatively far off in the future, difficult to imagine or visualize, and emanate from everyday activities, not an external and hostile source—are not easily acknowledged and are unlikely to become priority concerns for most people.”<sup>79</sup> In addition to the remoteness and general implausibility of “apocalyptic threats,” the authors also note that “expert opinion and indeed expert consensus, has tended to have a less sterling track record than most of us might like to admit.” It was not clear whether the authors were alluding to such embarrassing (to climate alarmists) events as the hacking of emails at the London Climate Met Office and the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, the notorious 2009 “climategate” event, or to the growing scientific skepticism regarding the so-called consensus view regarding

anthropogenic climate change. What is clear is that apocalyptic rhetoric is increasingly unpersuasive.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, there are good reasons for a decline in the plausibility of alarmist rhetoric.

Eric Swyngedouw, who appears to agree that global climate change is “increasingly staged as signalling a great danger, of epic dimensions, that, if unheeded, might radically perturb, if not announce the premature end of civilization before its sell-by date has passed,” and in consequence, to believe that “the future of our common human and non-human world calls for radical changes in all manner of domains, from the way we produce and organize the transformation and socio-physical metabolism of nature to routines and cultures of consumption.” Nevertheless he is also capable of looking at the practical consequences of “apocalypse forever” talk.<sup>81</sup> The great problem, as he sees it, is that contemporary environmental millennialism “preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption.” As another well known man of the left, Martin Jay, observed, modern human beings, who clearly include those pursuing environmental justice agendas, have “an unquenchable fascination with being on the verge of an end that never comes.”<sup>82</sup> The end never comes for the obvious reason that all the climate change predictions, as Yogi Berra might have said, are about the future. Among other things, by such orthodox philosophy of science criteria as falsifiability, which Popper has argued constitute the substance of the natural scientific method, predictions, even when bolstered by impressive computer models, are entirely unscientific.<sup>83</sup>

More to the point, the apocalyptic rhetoric surrounding anthropogenic climate change, which promises neither the realization of an end-time nor redemption from it, makes discussion or even conversation with individuals whose consciousness is overwhelmed by apocalyptic fantasies difficult, if not impossible. This is neither the first time that ordinary commonsensical



political leaders have had to deal with ideologically disordered antagonists. And surely it will not be the last. As noted: hubris begets nemesis.

#### 4. Concluding Reflections

This report has looked at a considerable amount of literature in the social sciences concerned with the evolution and history of philanthropic foundations in North America. There may still be additional studies that remain unexamined, but the author is confident that a fair and adequate sample of what social scientists have written about philanthropic foundations concerned with the environment has been discussed in this report.

To conclude, let me first recall the argument made in the preceding pages: (1) there has been in the past generation a large increase in the number of and wealth of philanthropic foundations, including foundations concerned with environmental problems; (2) the old distinction between foundations that fund research and researchers who conduct investigations and publish the results has been replaced by philanthropic activism, on the one hand, and an eclipse of the distinction between activists external to the philanthropy and “inert” cheque-writing supporters, on the other: today philanthropic foundations are themselves often staffed and directed by environmental activists; (3) both left- and right-wing foundations are comfortable acting within this philanthropic and regulatory environment and the free-for-all opportunities it presents to them; (4) the advent of “regranting” foundations enables anonymous donors to support environmental activists and still receive a charitable tax receipt by donating to a philanthropic foundation that at least nominally oversees the environmental activists. In short, the major innovation in philanthropic foundation activity in the past generation has been the effective capture of a significant number of grant-making bodies by environmental activists.

The ideological purposes served by philanthropic activism have coalesced around the notion of environmental justice. This innocuous term (who favours environmental injustice?) is in reality intended to evoke sentiments and eventually policies of de-industrialization—or “degrowth” as current environmental activists say—along with generally hostile attitudes towards capitalism.

A generation ago Marxists and social scientists who used Marxist approaches in their examination of social and political reality were often also socialists. Today Marxism has been largely de-coupled from socialism. That is, today most socialists are not Marxists and Marxists usually deny that their methods imply any commitment to a socialist future, however such a future may be imagined. As a result, industrialism is practically identified with capitalism. This historical change has simplified the environmentalists’ argument: industrial capitalism means pollution so being against pollution means being against capitalism. As Steve Tatum, president of Koch Minerals observed, with a certain degree of irony: “the investment banks, they don’t pollute very much, because they don’t make anything. We make stuff.”<sup>84</sup> One might extend the observation regarding bankers to the inhabitants of Hollywood and Silicon Valley. If you are in the business of making stuff, there will be pollution; if you make movies and software, there will be hardly any pollution. In this respect, it doesn’t matter a bit whether one considers carbon dioxide to be a pollutant.

In the Canadian context, anti-pollution means being against fossil fuels in general and the oil sands in particular. I have argued elsewhere that such attitudes are simply a reflection of the long-standing historical prejudices of Laurentian Canada, and its outposts in the Lower Mainland and on Vancouver Island, against the Prairie West and in particular against Alberta.<sup>85</sup> Such considerations provide additional context for the current report.

So far as the future of environmental philanthropy is concerned, two things seem clear. The first is that the apocalyptic rhetoric of so much current environmental discourse is unlikely to end anytime soon. (See the Appendix for an example of what I have in mind.) The evocation of an apocalypse has been part of Western political symbolism since the Book of Daniel in the Hebrew Bible. In the minds of those who evoke an apocalypse, it actually takes place in the sense that it is part of their lived experiences as human beings. There is, in other words, no reason to think that apocalyptic prophecies are going to end—despite the problems of cognitive dissonance so apparent to outsiders when the prophecies never become actual.<sup>86</sup>

A second thing one may anticipate is a growth in what, in the field of terrorism studies, is called self-radicalization. For law enforcement and counter-terrorism authorities, self-radicalization leading to “lone-wolf” attacks is a major new challenge. The Internet and social media are, clearly, technological enablers of both self-radicalization and lone-wolf phenomena. However, prior to these technological innovations, hostile individuals developed the notion of “leaderless resistance,” which is to say networks where members “knew what had to be done” even without direction from an administrative superior.<sup>87</sup> The leaderless resistance model appeals equally to jihadists and white supremacists, individuals who have nothing in common beyond the expectation that their violent activity will lead to apocalyptic transformations of reality. Of course, it doesn’t; but that does not seem to make any difference to the appeal of a violent act that will transfigure the world. There is no reason to think that a similar dynamic does not have the same effect on environmental radicals.

The point is not that environmentalists are terrorists. The overwhelming majority of environmentalists would likely be horrified at the suggestion—and with good reason. The point, rather, is that internet-and social-media-enabled organizations (and leaderless resistance) promise

to present additional challenges to both governments and private sector resource extraction and transportation companies in the future. This particular problem exists independently of, and in addition to, the difficulty of discussing practical matters with organized environmental activists, a problem emphasized several times in this report.

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### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> For an elaboration of the perspective I will be employing, see Kenneth Minogue, *Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology*. (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> See Peterson Commission, *Foundations Private Giving and Public Policy: Report and Recommendations of the Commission on Foundations and Private Philanthropy*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970), 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph C. Kiger, *Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century*, (Westport, Greenwood Press, 2000), 1.

<sup>4</sup> Bart Mongoven, "Philanthropies and Political Power," *Stratfor*, June 30, 2006. Available at [Stratfor.com](http://Stratfor.com)

<sup>5</sup> For a somewhat dated discussion of Canadian Foundations see Samuel A. Martin, *Financing Humanistic Service*, (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975) and Martin, *An Essential Grace: Funding Canada's Health Care, Education, Welfare, Religion and Culture*, (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1985).

<sup>6</sup> See Rand Quinn, Megan Tompkins-Strange, Debra Meyerson, "Beyond Grantmaking: Philanthropic Foundations as Agents of Cultural Change and Institutional Entrepreneurs," *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 43 (2014), 951.

<sup>7</sup> J. Craig Jenkins, Jason T. Carmichael, Robert J. Brulle, and Heather Boughton, "Foundation Funding of the Environmental Movement," *American Behavioural Scientist*, 61(13), (2018), 1647.

<sup>8</sup> Daniel Faber and Deborah McCarthy, "Introduction," to Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations for Social Change: Critical Perspectives on Philanthropy and Popular Movements*, (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 4.

<sup>9</sup> Jason T. Carmichael, J. Craig Jenkins, Robert J. Brulle, "Building Environmentalism: The Founding of Environmental Movement Organizations in the United States, 1900–2000," *The Sociological Quarterly*, 53 (2012), 427. See also Samuel P. Hays, *Reality, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1988*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Barry Cooper, Jason Hayes, Sylvia LeRoy, *Science Fact or Science Fiction? The Grizzly Biology Behind Parks Canada Management Models*, (Vancouver, Fraser Institute, Critical Issues Bulletin, 2002), 12–13.

<sup>10</sup> Robert J. Brulle, *Agency, Democracy and Nature: The US Environmental Movement from a Critical Theory Perspective*, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2000); see also Brulle and J. Craig Jenkins, "Foundations and the Environmental Movement: Priorities, Strategies and Impact," in Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations for Social Change*, 151–173.

<sup>11</sup> Brulle and Jenkins, "Foundations and the Environmental Movement," 163.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Alan Carter, "Some Theoretical Foundations for Radical Green Politics," *Environmental Values* 13 (2007), 305-28

<sup>13</sup> Francisco G. Delfin Jr. and Shui-Yan Tang, "Elitism, Pluralism, or Resource Dependency: Patterns of Environmental Philanthropy among Private Foundations in California," *Environment and Planning*, 39 (2007), 2167. See also E.H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, (Albany, SUNY, 1983), 18.

<sup>14</sup> For a discussion see R. Kelly Garrett, "Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and ICTs," *Information, Communication, and Society*, 9 (2006) 202–24. ICTs refers to "information and communications technologies," including social media.

<sup>15</sup> See Craig J. Jenkins, "Channeling Social Protest: Foundation Patronage of Contemporary Social Movements," in W. Powell, ed., *Private Action and Public Good*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), 202-16.

<sup>16</sup> Deborah McCarthy, "Environmental Justice Grantmaking: Elites and Activists Collaborate to Transform Philanthropy," *Sociological Inquiry*, 74 (2004), 258. For example J. Nadine Gracia and Howard K. Koh wrote about public health policies as a way of "Promoting Environmental Justice" (a term discussed below) in *American Journal of Public Health*, 101, Supplement 1 (2011) s-14-15. Neera M. Singh of the University of Toronto connected public health to "degrowth." See Singh, "Environmental Justice, Degrowth and Post-Capitalist Futures," *Ecological Economics*, 163 (2019), 138-42.

<sup>17</sup> See Tim Bartley, "How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of an Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification," *Social Problems*, 54, (2007), 229-55. Quotations taken from pp. 231 and 249.

<sup>18</sup> See D.E. Morrison and R.E. Dunlap, "Environmentalism and Elitism: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis," *Environmental Management*, 10 (1986), 589.

<sup>19</sup> Jenkins, *et al.*, "Foundation Funding of the Environmental Movement," 1643, 1654.

<sup>20</sup> Jenkins, *et al.*, "Foundation Funding of the Environmental Movement," 1654. For a discussion of Foucault see Cooper, *Michel Foucault: An Introduction to the Study of his Thought*, (Toronto, Edwin Mellen, 1982.) We discuss the question of environmental justice in the following section.

<sup>21</sup> Dowie, "Support Grass-Roots Environmentalists," *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, 18:13 (April 20, 2006), 35-7.

<sup>22</sup> So far as I know the distinction was first made by Allan J. Ciglar and Burdett A. Loomis, *Interest Group Politics*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., (Washington, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995). It has since become a conventional distinction among social science analysts.

<sup>23</sup> Mayer, *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right*, (New York, Doubleday, 2016), 78.

<sup>24</sup> A.K. Nagai, R. Lesner, and S. Rothman, *Giving for Social Change: Foundations, Public Policy, and the American Political Agenda*, (Westport, Praeger, 1994), 27.

<sup>25</sup> Daniel R. Faber and Deborah McCarthy, "Breaking the Funding Barrier: Philanthropic Activism in Support of the Environmental Justice Movement," in Faber and McCarthy eds., *Foundations for Social Change*, 193.

<sup>26</sup> James Piereson, "Investing in Conservative Ideas," *Commentary* 119:5 (May, 2005), 49.

<sup>27</sup> See Quinn, *et al.*, "Beyond Grantmaking," 952. The broad right-wing response to Bundy's initiative has been extensively documented in Mayer's *Dark Money*.

<sup>28</sup> P. DiMaggio "Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory," in L. Zucher, ed., *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment*, (Cambridge, Ballinger, 1988), 14.

<sup>29</sup> Kiger discussed government investigations of philanthropic organizations and their activities in the US, Canada, and Britain in *Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century*, *passim*.

<sup>30</sup> Kiger, *Philanthropic Foundations*, 168-9.

<sup>31</sup> Mayer, *Dark Money*, 141-2.

<sup>32</sup> Mayer, *Dark Money*, 207.

<sup>33</sup> See also Sally Covington, "Moving Public Policy to the Right: The Strategic Philanthropy of Conservative Foundations" in Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations for Social Change*, 89-114.

<sup>34</sup> Robert O. Bothwell, "Up Against Conservative Public Policy: Alternatives to Mainstream Philanthropy," in Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations for Social Change*, 133. Supporters are also of the view that "the future of social change philanthropy is in the hands of "social change foundations, the largest being the Tides Foundation." See John C. Urschel, "Coming Out of the Green Closet: Wealth Discourse and the Construction of Social Change Philanthropists," in Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations For Social Change*, 251.

<sup>35</sup> Bothwell, "Up Against Conservative Public Policy," 133.

<sup>36</sup> Rupert Darwall, *Green Tyranny: Exposing the Totalitarian Roots of the Climate-Industrial Complex*, (New York, Encounter Books, 2017), 213.

<sup>37</sup> United States Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Minority Staff Report, *The Chain of Environmental Command: How a Club of Billionaires and Their Foundations Control the Environmental Movement and Obama's EPA*, July 30, 2014, p. 54. See also the series of reports by Hayden Ludwig in Foundation Watch, available at: <https://capitalresearch.org>.

- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, Anthony Heyes and Brayden King, "Understanding the Organization of Green Activism: Sociological and Economic Perspectives," *Organization and Environment*, (2018) 1–24.
- <sup>19</sup> Delfin and Tang, "Elitism, Pluralism or Resource Dependency," 2169.
- <sup>40</sup> Delfin and Tang, "Elitism, Pluralism or Resource Dependency," 2173.
- <sup>41</sup> See for example the large selection of papers published in John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosbers, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011).
- <sup>42</sup> Delfin and Tang, "Foundation Impact on Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations: 'The Grantees Perspective,'" *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 37 (2008), 604.
- <sup>43</sup> Delfin and Tang, "Foundation Impsct," 620.
- <sup>44</sup> San Francisco, California Environmental Associates, 2007.
- <sup>45</sup> *Design to Win*, 16.
- <sup>46</sup> See Matthew C. Nisbet, "Strategic Philanthropy in the Post-Cap-and-Trade Years: Reviewing US Climate and Energy Foundation Funding," *WIREs Climate Change*, 9 (2018), 524-541.
- <sup>47</sup> Skocpol, *Naming the Problem: What Will it Take to Counter Extremism and Engage Americans: the Fight against Global Warming*, Report prepared for the Symposium on The Politics of America's Fight Against Global Warming, Feb. 14, 2013, Harvard University.
- <sup>48</sup> The acid rain campaign was a *political* success, but its scientific status was highly questionable. See Aaron Wildavsky, *But is it True? A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995); Darwall, *Green Tyranny*, 57-82. The bogus science that underlay the anti-acid rain campaign explains why it is no longer discussed by environmentalists.
- <sup>49</sup> Skocpol, *Naming the Problem*, 44-6.
- <sup>50</sup> Nisbet, "Strategic Philanthropy," 529-30.
- <sup>51</sup> Luers, "Rethinking US Climate Advocacy," *Climate Change*, 120 (2013). 15.
- <sup>52</sup> Carmichael, Jenkins and Brulle, "Building Environmentalism," 428.
- <sup>53</sup> On ecofeminism, for example, the discussions over the past twenty years or so have grown increasingly arcane. See, for example, Robert R.M. Verchick, "In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice," *Harvard Women's Law Review*, 19 (1996), 23-88; Irene Diamond and Gloria Reman Orenstein, eds., *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, (San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1990); Greta Gaard, ed., *Ecofeminism: Woman, Animals, Nature*, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992); Karen Warren, Misran Erkal, eds., *Ecofeminism: Woman, Culture, Nature*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997); Kristin A. Gross, "Foundations of Feminism: How Philanthropic Patrons Shaped Gender Politics," *Social Science Quarterly*, 88 (2007), 1174-81; Maria Mies, Vandana Shiva, Ariel Salleh, eds., *Ecofeminism*, (New York, Zed Books, 2014).
- <sup>54</sup> See Stephen M. Gardiner, "Climate Justice" in Dryzek *et al.*, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society*, 309-22.
- <sup>55</sup> See Michael Dreiling and Brian Wolf, "Environmental Movement Organizations and Political Strategy," *Organization and Environment*, 14 (2001) 34-54; Deborah McCarthy, "Environmental Justice Grantmaking: Elites and Activists Collaborate to Transform Philanthropy," *Sociological Inquiry*, 74 (2004), 250-70; Daniel R. Faber and Deborah McCarthy, "Breaking the Funding Barriers: Philanthropic Activism in Support of the Environmental Justice Movement," in Faber and McCarthy, eds., *Foundations for Social Change*, 175-209.
- <sup>56</sup> Frederick H. Buttel, "Environmental Sociology and the Explanation of Environmental Reform," *Organization and Environment*, 16 (2003), 313.
- <sup>57</sup> Nisbet, "Strategic Philanthropy," 538.
- <sup>58</sup> Herbert H. Haines, "Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights, 1957–1970." *Social Problems*, 32 (1984), 32.
- <sup>59</sup> See Bill McKibben, "The Reckoning," *Rolling Stone*, issue 1162 (August 2, 2012), 52-60, and the analysis of its tactical significance in Todd Schifeling and Andrew J. Hoffman, "Bill McKibben's Influence on U.S. Climate Change Discourse: Shifting Field-Level Debate Through Radical Flank Effects," *Organization and Environment*, 32 (2019), 213-33.
- <sup>60</sup> Schifeling and Hoffman, "Bill McKibben's Influence," 228.
- <sup>61</sup> Schifeling and Hoffman, "Bill McKibben's Influence," 228.

<sup>62</sup> Schifeling and Hoffman, "Bill McKibben's Influence," 229. The reference is to Klein's *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate*, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2014). In fact, many EJ supporters, particularly in Canada, are strongly anti-capitalist.

<sup>63</sup> Vancouver, UBC Press, 2009.

<sup>64</sup> Haluza-Delay, "Environmental Justice in Canada," *Local Environment*, 12 (2007), 557, 560. Much of the previous EJ research was published in geography journals that, in turn, are heavily Marxianized. See, for example Dianne Traper and Bruce Mitchell, "Environmental Justice Considerations in Canada," *The Canadian Geographer*, 45 (2001), 93-8; Cheryl Teelucksingh, Blake Polard, Clarise Buse, and Rebecca Hasdell, "Environmental Justice in the Environmental Non-Governmental Organization Landscape of Toronto (Canada)," *The Canadian Geographer*, 60 (2016), 381-93. See also Andil Gosine and Cheryl Teelucksingh, *Environmental Justice and Racism in Canada: An Introduction*, (Toronto, Edmond Montgomery, 2008).

<sup>65</sup> Michael Mascarenhas, "Where the Waters Divide: First Nations, Tainted Water and Environmental Justice in Canada," *Local Environment*, 12 (2007), 565-77; Justin Page, "Salmon Farming in First Nations' Territories: A Case of Environmental Injustice on Canada's West Coast," *Local Environment*, 12 (2007) 613-26.

<sup>66</sup> See Teelucksingh, "Environmental Racialization: Linking Racialization to the Environment in Canada," *Local Environment*, 12 (2007), 645-61.

<sup>67</sup> Kaitlyn Mitchell and Zachary D'Onofrio, "Environmental Injustice and Racism in Canada: The First Step is Admitting We have a Problem," *Journal of Environmental Law and Practice*, 29 (2016), 305-45.

<sup>68</sup> Mitchell and D'Onofino, "Environmental Injustice and Racism," 320-21. Emphasis added. The intention clearly, was to claim that First Nations are part of the same pattern of racism that the American experience with slavery has imparted to that society.

<sup>69</sup> Scott, "The Networked Infrastructure of Fossil Capitalism: Implications of the New Pipeline Debates for Environmental Justice in Canada," *Revue Générale de droit*, 43 (2013) 11-66.

<sup>70</sup> Scott, "The Networked Infrastructure of Fossil Capitalism," 56.

<sup>71</sup> Scott, "The Networked Infrastructure of Fossil Capitalism," 60.

<sup>72</sup> Scott, "The Networked Infrastructure of Fossil Capitalism," 64.

<sup>73</sup> Frost, "First Nations Sovereignty, Environmental Justice, and Degrowth in Northwest BC, Canada," *Ecological Economics*, 162 (2019), 134.

<sup>74</sup> Frost, "First Nations Sovereignty," 138.

<sup>75</sup> See Riley E. Dunlap and Aaron M. McCright, "Organized Climate Change Denial," 144-60; Kari Marie Norgaard, "Climate Denial: Emotion, Psychology, Culture and Political Economic," 399-413; both in Dryzek *et al.*, eds, *Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society*. Other less academic studies use much more abusive rhetoric—though the notion that scientific disagreement constitutes a psychological problem gives credence to critics of scientific orthodoxy that non-scientific elements are central to criticism of "deniers."

<sup>76</sup> Frost, "First Nations Sovereignty," 137.

<sup>77</sup> Frost, "First Nations Sovereignty," 139.

<sup>78</sup> See Anthony Heyes and Brayden King, "Understanding the Organization of Green Activism: Sociological and Economic Perspectives," *Organization and Environment*, 31 (2018), 1-24.

<sup>79</sup> Ted Norhaus and Michael Schellenberger, "Apocalypse Fatigue: Losing the Public on Climate Change," *Yale Environment 360*, Nov 16, 2009. Available at <https://e.360.yale.edu>

<sup>80</sup> See also Janet Fisko, "Apocalypse and Ecotopia: Narratives in Global Climate Change Discourse," *Race, Gender, and Class*, 19 (2012), 12-36.

<sup>81</sup> See Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change," *Theory, Culture and Society*, 27 (2010), 215.

<sup>82</sup> Jay, "The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Inability to Mourn" in G. Robinson and J. Rundell, eds., *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*, (New York, Routledge, 1994), 33.

<sup>83</sup> See Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, (New York, Routledge, 2002), 293.

<sup>84</sup> Quoted in Mayer, *Dark Money*, 275-6.

<sup>85</sup> See Cooper, *It's the Regime, Stupid! A Report from the Cowboy West on Why Stephen Harper Matters*, (Toronto, Key Porter, 2009) and Cooper, "Challenges for Western Independence," *The Frontier Centre*, forthcoming.

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<sup>86</sup> So much is obvious from Dowie's paper, "Support Grass-Roots Environmentalism," cited above, as it is from more recent phenomena such as the attention paid to a truant Swedish teenager, Greta Thunberg.

<sup>87</sup> The notion of leaderless resistance was initially developed by a retired American intelligence officer, Col. Ulius "Pete" Louis Amoss, and elaborated by a white supremacist, Louis Beam. I have discussed the problem in Cooper, *New Political Religions: An Analysis of Modern Terrorism*, (Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2004), ch. 5.



## APPENDIX

# Fighting to Win


## Choking Out the Rig Pigs, One Pipeline at a Time

It is 2016, and the struggle continues against the abomination known as the tar sands. I'm happy to report that the combined force of indigenous land defenders and the environmental movement have so far been able to keep a chokehold on new pipeline projects, save one. The northern leg of the Keystone XL is dead, Northern Gateway is as good as dead, Energy East is looking less and less likely, and the Trans-Mountain pipeline remains in limbo. Due to the collapse of oil prices, the boom is most definitely over in Alberta. There have been thousands of layoffs, major projects have been cancelled, companies are losing money hand over fist, and it is only a matter of time before the new economic reality strangles many more projects to death.


That is to say: We are winning. This is a war of attrition, and we are wearing those bastards down. Our strategy has always been to chisel away at the profitability of the tar sands by slowing them down, discouraging investment, affecting their bottom line, and blocking their access to tidewater. It will appear to some, when they look back on the great crash of the Athabasca tar sands in Alberta, that it was the invisible hand of the market at work. Only those who were paying close attention will know to what extent our movement was responsible for stopping the spread of this cancer.

For now, the critical battleground in the war against the tar sands is Enbridge's Line 9. The almost 40-year-old pipeline is now pumping crude from Sarnia to Montreal. If left uninterrupted, Line 9 would allow the expansion of the tar sands by providing an export market for diluted bitumen. It puts the drinking water of millions at risk and exacerbates the slow industrial genocide known as Chemical Valley, a hub of more than 60 refineries that surround the heavily-polluted Aamjiwnaang First Nation. Line 9 is also part of a larger plan to export bitumen out of Portland, Maine, which would require an expansion of the Portland Montreal Pipeline, also in limbo.

Despite a years-long, hard-fought campaign against Line 9, which employed a diversity of tactics, from lobbying to legal



December 3, 2015: Activists manually shut off Enbridge's Line 9 pipeline in the first of a string of similar actions.



Map of Enbridge's Tar Sands Pipeline Plan from Environmental Defence Canada

battles to direct action, Line 9 transported crude to a refinery in Montreal on December 3, 2015. On December 7, we shut it down. Mainstream media reported that Enbridge shut down Line 9 as a "precautionary measure," but we know better. We closed the valve manually. I was part of a group that broke their locks, called Enbridge, and then closed the valve. Then we locked ourselves to it using Kryptonite U-locks reinforced with steel. This is historic: To our knowledge, this was the first time that activists manually shut down a pipeline. Who would have thought it could be so simple?

The day of the action, Enbridge stock plunged eight percent. For a company worth almost 60 billion dollars, that's about 4.8 billion dollars.

There was a definite sense of exuberance following the action. One of the notable successes is how this shut-off, which many people would consider radical, enjoyed broad support. It was organized by anarchists but was publicly supported by citizens' groups and the ex-mayor of the town where it took place.

This whole action was also a test of Canada's new anti-terrorism law, C-51, which expands the definition of terrorism to include tampering with critical infrastructure, i.e. pipelines. Our line of thinking was this: If they charged us with terrorism, they'd be saying that a large segment of the population supports terrorism, and the state would lose the usefulness of the terrorism label to demonize an isolated political element.

There's no question that this action breathed new life into the anti-Line 9 campaign, which NGOs long ago abandoned as unwinnable. For the first time in a long while, militants are fighting to win.

In the aim of spreading accurate, in-depth information about this action, I present to you the most detailed account of events available. It's my hope that this inspires you magickal elves out there to get yerselves a-plottin'.

### Timeline of action:

0615—First affinity group arrives at site. They unload supplies from vehicles and move them off-site.

0645—Jean Leger calls the Enbridge emergency number and

tells them that he is closing the valve. This is filmed by a journalist co-conspirator. The whole valve and the ground start vibrating. To avoid a potential explosion, the valve is opened slightly. The ground continues to vibrate, and the sound of pressurized flow is audible.

0730—Patricia Domingos, ex-mayor of Sainte-Justine-de-Newton, shows up. She has been very active in the fight against Enbridge for over three years and is completely delighted about what is happening. For the rest of the day she acts as spokesperson. Because Enbridge still has not showed up, she calls the emergency number a second time. Incredibly, she can't reach anyone who speaks French. Enbridge takes her name and number and tells her they'll call her back.

0824—Ontario Provincial Police show up. Hilariously, they have no idea what is going on; they were just showing up to tell someone to move their car, which was parked in a church parking lot. When they figure out what's happening, they express their gladness that the valve is on the Quebec side of the border, hence not their problem. They leave the scene.

Approx. 0830—Second affinity group (larger than the first) shows up and begins setting up tents, hanging banners, filming, tweeting, and being an awesome support team.

Approx. 0845—A francophone Enbridge employee calls Madame Domingos and finally they get the message. They tell her that the pipeline isn't closed, that everything's showing up as normal on their monitoring system. Take a second to let that sink in. What does that say about their much-hyped high-rech security measures?

Approx. 0900—Activists unlock and the valve is firmly closed. The vibration reaches a fever pitch, but once the valve is wrenched as far as humanly possible to the right, the vibration stops altogether. Activists lock back onto the valve.

0917—Cops from the Surete de Quebec (the SQ—Quebec's militarized national police) arrive.

1002—Enbridge employees arrive.

1120—An Enbridge employee, flanked by SQ officers, reads a statement in French ordering activists to leave the area.

1353—The "specialist" team arrives. Whatever they're specialists in, it's not cutting locks. The next few hours are a comedy of errors on the part of the police.

1422—SQ establishes a perimeter and tells media to go to the road. Media leave initially, but are back minutes later and continue to film at a close distance for the rest of the day. The crowd of supporters also remains close at hand, maintaining an unruly and bold presence throughout the action. Fortunately, no supporters were arrested.

Around this same time, the two activists locked to the valve superglue their locks shut. From this moment on, they no longer have any ability to unlock themselves. People begin to sing, and the sun comes out.

The activist locked to the fence is arrested, to raucous cheering, singing, and chanting. He is taken into custody and released about an hour and a half later.

During an attempt to handcuff one of the activists locked to the valve, another valve that is part of the infrastructure sprays oil all over the place. All hell breaks loose at this point. One woman rushes towards the cage and is knocked down by cops. The intensity of the crowd reaches a climax. The cops seem genuinely scared at this point, as they suddenly realize that they're in a potentially explosive situation.

The crowd begins chanting for paramedics and firefighters to be brought to the scene, taunting the police for their incompetence. Police stop trying to extract the two people still locked down, and the jubilant crowd breaks into song, which continues for a long time. This is the energetic high-point of an already awesome day.

Approx. 1600 or 1630—Firefighters arrive with a whole bunch of heavy-duty equipment and break the valve, hauling the two remaining activists away with U-locks still on their necks.

Approx. 1700 or 1730—Enbridge employees move in and immediately open the valve.

One of the activists who locked down refused to sign off on non-association conditions, but when he was brought to jail he was denied entry because he had a lock around his neck! He spent the night at the police station and was released the following day, with no non-association conditions.

Speaking as a participant, this action was definitely a high point in my activism career. The support was absolutely incredible, the solidarity expressed through song and action was beyond beautiful, and everything about the entire day seemed to unfold according to the benevolent whims of some trickster god. A few days after the action, I wrote:

*It was a great success, in that we come out of it feeling stronger than we went into it. We're anarchists and we see struggles against pipelines as a part of a broader struggle. We fight for the terrain of the imagination. If our action inspires others, if it causes them to see resistance as viable, if it causes them to brainstorm new tactics, we will be content that we are contributing to a great drama, a story that does not begin or end with us. The value of this struggle lies not only in its immediate aims, but in its ability to bring people together in the spirit of defiance, creating a culture of resistance that will grow over the course of years. Our project is nurturing that spirit of determination, and disseminating our ideas widely, so that they might take root where they will, so that as the effects of the age of crisis we live in become increasingly dire, a culture of resistance will emerge that is able to survive and thrive independent of the state and fossil fuel economy.*



December 21, 2015: Activists in Anishnaabe territory shut down Line 9 again.

These words gained new meaning on December 21, when three comrades on Anishnaabe territory near Aamijiwnaung First Nation shut down Line 9 again, with a clear anti-colonial message denouncing the oil industry for environmental racism. They locked down under a banner that read "Enbridge Represents Colonial Violence." One of the womyn who locked down was an Anishnaabe land defender by the name of Vanessa Gray, who has been a major voice against Line 9, the tar sands, and Chemical Valley throughout this whole campaign. She expressed her motive thusly: "It's clear that tar sands projects represent an ongoing cultural and environmental genocide. I defend the land and water because it is sacred. I have the right to defend anything that threatens my traditions and culture." The three activists were charged with some pretty heavy charges, including "Mischief Endangering Life," which comes with a maximum sentence of life in prison.

Since these two public actions, a campaign of sabotage has begun. Twice now, brave militants have acted clandestinely, shutting down Enbridge's Line 7 pipeline on January 3, and both Line 7 and Line 9 on January 25. Both of these attacks issued communiqués:

January 3:

*Sometime in the night of January 3rd, 2016, individuals stole into the dark near so-called Cambridge and used a manual pipeline valve to restrict the flow of Enbridge's Line 7. We then applied our own locking devices to delay response time...*

*This action was undertaken to show our ever lasting love and support to the brave folks who've taken similar actions in the traditional territories of the Huron-Wendat, Mohawk, and Anishinaabek people.*

*Further, we take action to counter the new narrative of the state; to swing back at the grossly inflated charges those in Sarnia received, and show that we will not be cowed.*

*We fight for the land and water; and we fight for our lives.*

*We will always fight back, whether it's with the sun warming our faces, or the moonlight to guide us.*

*Join us.*

January 25:

*...we took this action to stand in unity with all those who*

*have defended the land before us, and for those who decide to take action after us. We take it to fight against an industry that puts us at risk every day and subjects frontline communities to violence upon their bodies, communities and cultures—for profit. We believe that's worth fighting against; that those people and communities are worth fighting for. So call us what you will, but we only do what is both necessary and right. Our actions hurt none, but a lack of action hurts everyone. May we all find the courage to actively resist & destroy exploitative capitalist industrial projects. Fuck Enbridge, fuck the tarsands, and fuck all pipelines...*

Every action like this costs Enbridge money and increases the whole mood of uncertainty surrounding the tar sands industry. After the January 25 action, an Enbridge spokesperson said: "We are taking additional permanent security measures at valve sites to help discourage such activities. We would not discuss details publicly since that would risk reducing the effectiveness of those measures."

Reality check: The vast network of Enbridge pipelines criss-crossing Turtle Island is far too large to be effectively surveilled. Also, since it is one of our goals to cost them money, we can count every dollar they spend on security guarding their valves and investigating us as another strike against them.

There will never be a better time to shut down Line 9 than 2016. Enbridge has said that, for the entire year, they will be running Line 9 below capacity, making an explosion or spill



Aichigon Coalition Against Tar Sands activists protesting the Stuckbridge Enbridge construction site in July 2015.

less likely now than it might be in the future. Also, I imagine that the recent actions have caused increased vigilance in Enbridge's pipeline-monitoring control centre. For those of you who wish to learn more, there is a fair amount of useful information that can be found online. Check out [DISSEMINATION.NOBLOUS.ORG](http://DISSEMINATION.NOBLOUS.ORG) and [PIPELEAKS.ORG](http://PIPELEAKS.ORG).

Stopping future pipelines will be far easier than Line 9. Because Line 9 was already in the ground, there were fewer sites of intervention, and this was also the first campaign of its kind in our bioregion. Our movement is growing—of that there is no doubt. It seems likely to me that if we are able to shut down Line 9, the rest of the export pipelines will go poof.

There is also a chance that Line 9 could be shut down if Canada's Supreme Court rules in favour of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, who have been fighting Line 9 in court for a long time. In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of indigenous rights in some surprising ways, and the Chippewas of the Thames have a strong case. There has recently been some great news on this front—after being pressured by anarchists, Quebec NGO Coule Pas Chez Nous donated \$10,000 to help with the Supreme Court challenge.

I think that I would be remiss to write an article about the tar sands with a solely celebratory tone. As Vanessa Gray said, the tar sands are an ongoing act of genocide. Their existence is to be mourned deeply. As anyone who has been to Chemical Valley knows, we have a long, long way to go. Even if they were to shut down the tar sands tomorrow, the damage that has been done is irreparable. The famous tailings ponds that can be seen from space are leaking every day, poisoning the Athabasca River, the communities downstream, and the ocean. Every day that this grievous assault on us all continues, the future is further impoverished.

What's more, as the money from the tar sands dries up, companies may well implement cost-cutting measures that decrease safety. Nexen's 70,000 barrel-per-day Long Lake in-situ facility recently closed after two accidents—a massive bitumen spill and an explosion that killed two people. I suspect that both, these tragedies may have resulted from attempts to lower costs, and that Long Lake was shut down because Nexen realized that their cost-cutting was going to end up costing them more in the long run. As pipeline infrastructure falls into disrepair, there will likely be an increase in accidents. It would be strategic to cause the most uproar possible if and when such incidents occur.

Lastly, Line 9 is currently online, and for every day that it is operational, a time bomb ticks on. Disabling it permanently will require a stark escalation on the part of militants. Who amongst you will answer this call? For those of you who entered this world desiring to prove your courage, fate beckons. Think of a river that you love and feel the sickness of the world. Are you willing to do what is necessary? You to whom these words whisper in the language of destiny, know this: When one risks all for the benefit of life, one performs the ultimate act of love, and their reward will be beautiful beyond reckoning.

We have before us a window of possibility, and there is no telling how long it will be open. Our force is now multiplied

by economic factors we played no role in creating. The price of oil will eventually rebound, whether because of a new war, the machinations of the House of Saud, or both. When it does, will we be closer to liberation?

Is the fight to shut down the tar sands a means or an end? An objective or a strategy? For if it is seen as a mission to be accomplished, we will have succeeded only in slaying the ugliest head of the hydra—we will still be in the clutches of our enemies, and it will only be a matter of time before history begins to repeat itself. That is why I invite y'all to ask yourselves, what will we do after we win? The networks, alliances, and relationships that have been forged these past years are an important legacy of this campaign. What will become of them?

To become a revolutionary movement we must evolve past a reactive model of activism to a visionary one. I believe that the time is drawing near for the advent of a new approach to ecological struggle, one that involves more people on a full-time basis; one that prefigures the desired society it envisions. We must learn to craft our terms of engagement with the enemy and seize the initiative away from industry and government, making them react to us.

Victory is not enough, as long as we are attackers with nothing to defend. Democracy is resilient because it allows the people to win in ways that leave the power structure intact. Let us not forget that fascism is on the rise worldwide, and that the stability of the world, politically, economically, and ecologically, is more precarious than any of us want to believe. We would be wise to prepare for what is to come. In the absence of an imminent threat, we would do well to build up our infrastructure and means of sustenance.

I wrote this article with the express purpose of lionizing our movement, because it's important for people who struggle for what they believe in to have a sense that what they are doing is amounting to something. The more people believe in something, the easier it gets to believe in it; and in order to achieve our goals, we've got to believe that we can achieve them. The list of victories that we have racked up as a movement over the past few years is almost too long to commit to memory.

No single action is ever decisive in campaigns like these; it is the cumulative effect of countless people's years of efforts that yields results. To be a part of a movement like this is as humbling as it is exhilarating. I don't feel like an individual when I write this; I feel more like a part of a historical force. And now I have cause to back up a feeling that I have long held: When enough people summon the resolve to fight for the Earth, their efforts will pay off, and they will find themselves the beneficiaries of unexpected twists of fate.

So hail to the Unist'ot'en Camp, the Tar Sands Blockade, Owe Aku, Swamp Line 9, the Healing Walk, the Toxic Tour, and the others, too many to name, who have steadfastly resisted the oil industry on Turtle Island. Thank you for all that you have done. The power of the movement stands as a testament to your strength and determination.

There has never been a better time to attack. The enemy is weakened, and each strike hastens its demise. Let's intensify our efforts to disable this death machine once and for all. ✕

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## **About the Author**

Barry Cooper, a fourth generation Albertan, was educated at Shawnigan Lake School, the University of British Columbia and Duke University. He taught at several Laurentian Canadian universities before coming to the University of Calgary in 1981. He has published around 200 articles and over 30 books, most recently Consciousness and Politics: From Analysis to Meditation in the late work of Eric Voegelin, (St Augustine's Press, 2018); in 2004, the University of Missouri Press published New Political Religions: An Analysis of Modern Terrorism, a copy of which was recovered from the personal library of the late Osama bin Laden when his compound in Abbottabad was visited by members of Seal Team Six; Paleolithic Politics: The Human Community in Early Art will be published by the University of Notre Dame Press in the spring of 2020. He has received numerous grants from private and public granting agencies in Canada, the United States, France and Germany including a Konrad Adenauer Award and a Killam Research Fellowship. He has been a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada since 1993.